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In 1920, Oudendijk, a Dutch envoy based in Beijing, penned the following words to 
address what he perceived as an Asian threat at the time:
Compared to Japanese imperialism, Chinese imperialism is different. Japan is in 
the process of establishing a hegemonic position in East Asia, which fosters a 
dangerous form of imperialist thinking in the region ... The "Chinese threat," on 
the other hand, is the great number of Chinese people and large-scale 
immigration to the Indies [that] becomes increasingly significant to the Chinese 
government ... Although China has not ripened its pure imperialist visions in a 
modern sense, it would mature in the years to follow ... Chinese imperialism 
could be fateful for the Dutch future.1
When writers spoke of the Asian threat between the 1920s and 1940s, they 
generally identified Japan as the dominant power that endangered European rule in 
Southeast Asia. Oudendijk's words to the headquarters in The Hague, however, reveal
1DNA 2.05.38-2787: Letter from Oudendijk to Netherlands Foreign Affairs, April 7,1920.
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that his fear of the "yellow peril" in this period was not limited just to the growth of 
Japan. In fact, his message echoed Dutch despair and anxiety regarding what 
Oudendijk termed "Chinese imperialism." This study explores the colonial practices 
and policies that the Dutch empire adopted to counter the danger of that so-called 
Chinese imperialism, a term that has been barely used in the existing scholarship, but 
appears—as this essay shows—in archival sources.
A close reading of the correspondence between colonial officers in the Dutch East 
Indies, Dutch officials in China, and the metropolitan government in The Hague 
reveals that prevailing Sinophobia, particularly Dutch fear of Chinese imperialism, was 
more immediate and intense than their fear of an increasingly powerful Japan. The fear 
of China, and Chinese expansionism, particularly, stemmed from the flows of people 
who, the officials believed, carried Chinese imperialist thinking with them to the Dutch 
East Indies. Although the colonial officials worried about Japan's expansion into 
Southeast Asia, particularly with regards to promoting the idea of "Asia for Asians" in 
the region, correspondence kept in the Dutch and British archives shows that colonial 
authorities in the 1920s were more concerned with immediately obstructing Chinese 
expansionist activities in Southeast Asia than with preventing the growth of the 
Japanese empire.
The views expressed by the officials representing the Western empires in Asia in 
the 1920s, such as those of Oudendijk, illustrate their worries about the dangerous 
connections between the rapid growth of Chinese migration,2 3China's expansion to 
Southeast Asia, and the spread of Chinese expansionist thinking, which appeared to be 
criss-crossing the Chinese and Southeast Asian waters. Alarmed by the increasing 
migratory movements between China and Southeast Asia, the interaction between the 
Chinese state and Southeast Asian Chinese communities, and migrants' awareness of 
Chinese expansionist ambitions, Dutch officials based in Asia anticipated that 
"imperialist" Chinese could eventually end Dutch colonial rule in Southeast Asia.1 
Sinophobia was not limited to Dutch-controlled territory. As this essay will show, 
British colonial documents, too, revealed that the British empire was seeking measures 
to halt pro-Chinese propaganda being circulated in British Malaya. In fact, British anti- 
Chinese policies in the early 1920s affected how Dutch authorities formulated their 
own countermeasures for obstructing Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. Therefore, 
although this essay focuses on the case of the Dutch East Indies, it includes a
2 The Chinese population in the Dutch Indies rose from 221,438 in 1860 to 537,316 in 1900, 809,039 in 1920, 
and 1,233,214 in 1930. See Li Xuemin ( T 'T  10  and Huang Kunzhang ( j+fti1-. "Huaren renkou"(^ACD) 
in Yinni Huaqiaoshi [ fp A  A flj | (Guangdong: Guangdong Gaodengjiaoyu chubanshe, 1987), p. 232.
3 Although Dutch fears regarding Chinese imperialism peaked in the early 1920s, Dutch paranoia about 
the growing Chinese population in the archipelago was present as early as the late seventeenth century. In 
the last decades of the VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, Dutch East India Company) era, 
company officials feared that increasing Chinese migration could potentially threaten the company's 
authority in VOC-controlled territories. Until the end of the VOC period, company officials were 
concerned about Chinese penetration to the central and eastern parts of Java. In order to limit the growth 
of migrants and the territorial extension of their influence, the company imposed immigration restrictions 
for the first time in 1711. Company officials in Batavia and Semarang also avoided renting land and 
villages along the coast to the Chinese, as a way to assert and protect the company's political authority. 
Despite introducing migration restrictions and limitations on land tenancy, however, the VOC failed to 
decrease the growing economic power of the Chinese. See Kwee Hui Kian, The Political Economy o f  Java 's 
Northeast Coast, c. 1740-1800: Elite Synergy (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2006), pp. 160-62.
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discussion of British anti-Chinese policies as well. A look at the British case sheds light 
on why the Dutch empire's representatives formulated their policies in this period in 
the way they did.
Prior to 1920, the term "Chinese imperialism" did not appear in colonial writings. 
The appearance of this term to describe "the Chinese threat" signified a change in the 
colonial perception of the Chinese presence. Many studies about the Indies Chinese in 
the late Dutch colonial era have described why Dutch colonial authorities felt 
threatened by the Indies Chinese, causing them to launch a series of anti-Chinese 
policies directed at the Indies Chinese in the nineteenth century. What is missing in the 
existing scholarship is a profound discussion of how the Dutch empire dealt with the 
Chinese threat in the 1920s. During this period, the colonial officials no longer 
considered the Chinese community residing in the Dutch colony as the main source of 
the Chinese threat. Starting from the first decade of the twentieth century, it became 
increasingly evident that Sinophobia was engendered by a larger force, namely, a 
China that could potentially endanger Dutch rule. By the end of the second decade, the 
Chinese threat, in the eyes of Dutch officials, had magnified its geographical scale and 
intensity in the region. That change in perceived threat, as viewed through imperial 
and colonial eyes, required a significant change in policies for safeguarding colonial 
rule. Whereas prior to the 1900s, Dutch measures primarily focused on containing the 
power of the settled Chinese community within the Indies, the 1920s was an era during 
which the Dutch attempted to impede the traffic between China and the Indies by 
tightening border controls and transforming educational policies. Hence, I consider the 
early 1920s as an important period that introduced a change in Dutch policies towards 
"the Chinese threat." I argue that the shift in colonial policies and attitudes regarding 
borders and education was a colonial reaction to the heightened fear over Chinese 
imperialism.
To place this perceptual change in a historical perspective, and to gain insight 
regarding how colonial authorities came to interpret a threat they had previously seen 
as local now to be regional and "imperialist," this essay first draws on secondary 
literature to summarize the main features of pre-1920s Dutch policies against the 
proliferation of the local Chinese "threat." What follows next forms the core of the 
essay. Relying on archival sources, I discuss what measures Dutch authorities took for 
countering what they regarded as "Chinese imperialism" in the 1920s. For the purpose 
of understanding why the Dutch formulated certain policies, this section will be 
preceded by a short review of British anti-Chinese policies in that period.
The Border and Shifting Perceptions of the Chinese Threat
Dutch strategies for countering the Chinese threat by establishing border controls 
did not start in the 1920s. In fact, a century earlier, colonial authorities used "borders" 
and "boundaries" to limit the mobility of the Chinese in the Indies, in terms of both 
their physical and social (upward) mobility. When Dutch authorities legally drew the 
racial lines in 1854 with governmental regulation RR 109, they further cemented the 
Indies' stratified population layers into what Furnivall called "The Plural Society," that 
is, a society in which different groups of Indies residents lived separately yet side-by­
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side under one political entity.4 In the following decades, the Dutch government used 
its imposed racial boundaries further to control the spatial, economic, and social 
mobility of the colonized people, including those categorized as "Chinese people."5
Around the mid-nineteenth century, the Dutch clearly changed their overall 
policy from privileging the Chinese during the early VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie, Dutch East India Company) period, to discriminating against them in the 
era of high imperialism. At first, the Dutch relied on the Indies Chinese, who were 
predominantly merchants, and their domineering economic positions—developed 
thanks to their regional and inter-island networks—to increase the Empire's revenue.6 
Chinese retail trade flourished as Europeans arrived in Asia. The Dutch granted 
mercantile privileges to the Chinese, enabling the Chinese to consolidate their power 
further and diversify their economic activities and professions in the archipelago. The 
Chinese came to hold an important intermediate position in what Wertheim called "a 
colonial caste structure."7 This racially stratified system created opportunities for the 
Chinese to hold positions situated between the Indonesian masses and a small number 
of Europeans who held positions at the upper levels. On behalf of the Dutch 
government, the Chinese mainly worked as tax farmers and pawnshop operators, and 
were engaged in the salt monopoly and opium trades. They were able to extend their 
personal commercial networks from these ventures into the money-lending business, 
wholesale trade, and product acquisition for the export market.8 They also solidified 
their position with the government's monopoly lease system (the so-called pachtstelsel), 
under which the Chinese leased monopoly rights for salt, tobacco, and opium in the 
VOC's designated territory. The pachtstelsel enabled the Chinese to dominate trade 
within the archipelago—among the islands, as well as between the hinterland and 
urban areas. Besides granting them economic power, this system also conferred on 
Chinese merchants the status of "government agent," giving them leased government 
authority over the native population.9
4 J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study o f Plural Economy (Cambridge: The University Press, 1939), p. xv.
5 RR 109 of 1854 divided the colonial population according to racial lines. This racial classification made 
legal discrimination an accepted principle. After the declaration of RR 109, the Dutch government 
introduced regulations according to different racial categories, namely Europeans, Inlanders (natives), and 
Foreign Orientals. See C. Fasseur, "Cornerstone and Stumbling Block: Racial Classification and the Late 
Colonial State in Indonesia," in The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations o f the 
Netherlands Indies 1880-1942, ed. Robert Cribb (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), pp. 35-37.
6 For the history of Chinese trading communities and their role in flourishing Sino-Southeast Asian trade 
from the thirteenth to eighteenth centuries, see, for instance, Anthony Reid, "Flows and Seepages in the 
Long-Term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia," in Sojourners and Settlers: Histories o f Southeast Asia 
and the Chinese, ed. Anthony Reid (St. Leonards, NSW: Asian Studies Association of Australia in 
association with Allen & Unwin, 1996), pp. 15-49.
7 J. A. C. Mackie and Charles A. Coppel, "A Preliminary Survey," in The Chinese in Indonesia, ed. J. A. C. 
Mackie (Flonolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, in association with The Australian Institute of 
International Affairs, 1976), p. 4.
8 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
9 Cator stated that the monopoly-lease system was one of the most important factors that contributed to 
Chinese penetration in Java. By way of lease-granting contracts, large areas of land became administered 
by the Chinese. The Chinese became private holders of leased land with chartered rights. This also 
allowed them to possess leased government authority over the indigenous population. See W. J. Cator, The 
Economic Position o f the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1936), 
pp. 18-24; and George McTurnan Kahin, "The Political Position of the Chinese in Indonesia" (unpublished 
MA Thesis, Stanford University, 1946), pp. 7-20.
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However, the privileged position of the Chinese changed dramatically in the 
nineteenth century. Fearing the Chinese's growing power, and in line with the colonial 
government's primary stated principles (to insure people's protection against 
oppression and maintain security or peace and order: openbare rust en orde), the Dutch 
sought to weaken the power of the Indies Chinese by implementing the following 
policies: revisions to the Cultivation System (Cultuurstelsel), and the introduction of the 
Liberal System and Ethical Policy.10 The Cultivation System in the early 1830s, which 
focused on export-oriented crop production for the global market, ultimately helped 
strengthen and consolidate Chinese economic control over rural markets and the 
economic activities of the native population.11 However, even as they introduced the 
Cultivation System, the Dutch also imposed rules to restrict the mobility of the Chinese 
by geographically confining them in residential quarters (wijkenstelsel) and further 
restricting their freedom of movement with a pass system (passenstelsel). The Dutch 
argued that such restrictions were necessary to control economic activity and Dutch 
profits.12 13Cultuurstelsel was abolished in 1870, as it had proven ineffective, but Dutch 
authorities continued enforcing strict restrictions on Chinese travel and residency. For 
example, the Indies Chinese who boarded ships with the intention of leaving the 
designated district or the Indies without a proper pass were detained and charged with 
attempting to escape;12 this was true for both peranakan (Sino-Malay people whose 
ancestors migrated from China and settled in the archipelago for many generations) or 
singkeh (new immigrants from China).
10 Furnivall identified three stages outlining how the Dutch tried to protect its people. Around 1800, Dutch 
officials maintained that it was their duty to protect commoners against oppression. During the liberal 
period (1870-1900), Dutch authorities stated that it was their duty to protect people against native 
chieftains and planters. It was in this period that the Dutch colonial government started to prevent private 
planters from maintaining political and economic control. With the liberal system, foreigners (such as 
Chinese) were not allowed to possess native land, because the government feared that large sections of 
land would then be transferred to planters and Chinese moneylenders. Emphasis on the native 
population's welfare was further promoted during the Ethical Policy period, at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Although Dutch authorities upheld these principles, the government had problems with 
implementing the policies effectively. See J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study o f  
Burma and Netherlands India (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1956), pp. 219-30.
11 M. R. Fernando, "Introduction," in Chinese Economic Activity in Netherlands India: Selected Translation from  
the Dutch, ed. M. R. Fernando and David Bulbeck (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992).
12 The quarter system put foreigners of the same nationality in the same quarter. It was implemented in 
1800 to monitor colonial populations and to keep them separate. Residents in these quarters needed 
permission to travel outside their quarter, a regulation imposed by the pass system. Flowever, in 1846, 
Dutch gave foreigners permission to populate new settlements that were favorable for trade. Travel and 
residential restrictions were intended to contain Chinese economic activity in the interior, but it 
unintentionally helped Chinese merchants to penetrate new areas and consolidated their position in the 
rural markets. It enabled the Chinese to establish officially approved trading centers that functioned as ex­
territorial regions separated from the native surroundings. But the permit and quarter systems also had a 
negative effect on the Chinese, as they affected the economic structure of the Chinese population by 
preventing small farmers from spreading over the archipelago. See James Rush, Opium to Java: Revenue
I arming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910 (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1990), Chap. 5, pp. 87-89; Cator, The Economic Position o f the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies, p. 35; 
and G. William Skinner, "Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia," in Sojourners and Settlers:
Histories o f Southeast Asia and the Chinese, ed. Anthony Reid (St. Leonards, NSW: Asian Studies Association 
of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 1996), pp. 69-70.
13 Wen Guangyi [i&Jf 3£], Cai Renlong [H L fl], Liu Aihua [fij S^t], and Luo Mingqing j?J],
"Huaqiao minzu yishi de juexing ji qi yu Zhongguo geming yundong he dangdi minzu duliyundong de 
guanxi" f  H itk %\% \ in Yindunixiya Huaqiaoshi
(Beijing: Haiyang, 1985), pp. 297-300.
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The purpose of creating geographical boundaries within the colony and restricting 
Chinese mobility by way of the pass and district systems was twofold. On the one 
hand, Dutch authorities attempted to monitor and control Chinese economic activities 
as a way of safeguarding the colony's and empire's economic interests. That is, the 
Dutch hoped to contain Chinese expansion and dominance in trade and monopolies 
while simultaneously relying on Chinese networks and middlemen to increase the 
state's revenue. On the other hand, the regulations were meant to help prevent the 
commingling of races. The Dutch government deliberately segregated the Chinese 
from the native population. By drawing geographical units according to sharp racial 
distinctions, the Dutch authorities hoped to monitor the colonial population.14 In 
particular, the Dutch wanted to prevent the Chinese from operating like a native group 
for the purpose of evading taxation (the Chinese were obliged to pay higher taxes), as 
well as to prevent them from claiming too large a share of potential Dutch profits and 
spreading seditious thoughts among natives that would threaten Dutch rule.1'
During the Liberal System period, the Dutch further targeted the Chinese. 
Liberalists regarded the Chinese as opportunists and as a threat to the colony. 
Therefore, concerned about the welfare of the indigenous population and desiring to 
protect the colony's own economy, they enforced strict controls on the Chinese. 
Regarding the Chinese as oppressors of the native Javanese population, Fock, for 
instance, stated "[t]he Chinese exercised pernicious influence in the interior."16 This 
view was further strengthened during the anti-opium campaign, with the added 
argument that the power of opium corrupted the government's institutions.1'
The image of Chinese as a menace persisted during the Ethical Policy years, a 
period in which the Dutch launched a series of welfare programs for natives, such as a 
state-sponsored educational initiative, but excluded the Chinese from making use of 
those benefits.18 Dutch authorities stated that the goal was to protect the indigenous 
population from the exploitation of Chinese people who belonged to a pernicious race 
and mistreated natives.19
Although the district and pass systems were initially not exclusively applied to the 
Chinese, but were introduced to monitor the entire colonial population to protect 
Dutch interests, over the course of several decades these regulations, along with other 
anti-Chinese policies concerning taxes, citizenship issues, and equal treatment, formed 
the core of Chinese grievances.
As the scholarship on Indonesian Chinese has shown, Dutch restrictions on the 
Chinese were implemented to curb the growing power of the Indies Chinese, whom
14 In "Census, Map, Museum," Benedict Anderson described how, in the nineteenth century, the newly 
invented census revealed how the colonial state imagined its colonized people. He states that the racial 
aspect became more prominent in census categories as the colonial period progressed. See Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f  Nationalism (London and New York, 
NY: Verso, 2000 [1983], pp. 163-70.
15 Skinner, "Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia," p. 69.
16 Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study o f Plural Economy, p. 239.
17 James Rush, Opium to Java, Chap. 10.
18 Ibid., Chap. 11.
19 Patricia Tjook-Liem, De rechtspositie der Chinezen in Nederlands-Indie 1848-1942: Wetgevingsbeleid tussen 
Beginsel en Belang (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2009), pp. 297-333.
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the Dutch saw as threat.2" However, the meaning of "the Chinese threat" changed in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century. Whereas in the nineteenth century the 
Dutch targeted the Indies Chinese as the core of the Chinese threat that would 
endanger the power of the colonizer and disadvantage the natives, in the twentieth 
century the perceived threat shifted from the Indies Chinese communities to mainland 
China, which increasingly intervened in Dutch Indies Chinese affairs. This change in 
perception started when Chinese reformers, revolutionaries, state officials, and a large 
number of coolies from China entered the Dutch Indies, causing the Dutch colonial 
government to increase surveillance measures and prevent people's movement with 
high taxes, strict rules regarding mobility, and harsh treatment. As a result of these 
developments, by the early 1920s Dutch authorities had become convinced that their 
own Sinophobia was generated by external forces, particularly the Chinese Nationalist 
government. European authorities were particularly anxious about the spread in the 
colonies of anti-Western attitudes and ideologies derived from China. As a result, in 
order to alleviate Indies Chinese grievances and regain their political support, the 
Dutch government gradually relieved its border restrictions and racial boundaries. 
After 1904, the Dutch colonial government relaxed many regulations; in 1914, it 
removed its restrictions for traveling within Java and Madura, and in 1918 for traveling 
from these places to the Outer Islands.20 1 Thus, instead of targeting Indies Chinese 
mobility within the colony, the Dutch Empire shifted its focus on imposing boundaries 
and borders to limit influences that were arriving from outside its territory.
What measures did Dutch authorities take to prevent unwelcome political ideas 
from seeping into their colony? My argument, based on archival sources, will show 
that more and stricter colonial-protection policies resulted from the perceived 
escalating Chinese "threat." Focusing on the exchange of ideas that Dutch authorities 
defined as "Chinese imperialism," the remainder of this essay examines various border 
control and educational restrictions that the Dutch empire imposed for the purpose of 
eradicating Chinese expansionism on its territory. In order to gain a more complete 
understanding of Dutch actions, it is important first to discuss the British strategy of 
resisting the proliferation of anti-Western political ideas in the Straits Settlements, 
because British policy influenced Dutch actions on the same matter.
Protecting the Colonial Borders: Controlling the Flows of Thought
The British Straits Settlements
In 1920, the British colonial government launched its Education Bill in the Straits 
Settlements with the purpose of controlling what they perceived as an influx of 
overseas Chinese propaganda in their colonies. With this ordinance, British authorities 
wanted to exert ideological control over their colonial subjects. The goal of this bill was 
to remove all political propaganda that was hostile to British authority. British officials 
declared schools that disseminated Guomindang's (The Chinese Nationalist Party, 
hereafter GMD) propaganda to be illegal institutions and forced those schools to close.
20 This view of the Chinese was not limited to the Dutch colony, but also prevailed in Southeast Asia and 
the United States.
21W. J. Cator, The Economic Position o f the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies, pp. 32-33.
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One of the clauses in the ordinance declared: "[i]f the Governor in Council considers 
that any school is being used for purposes of political propaganda detrimental to the 
colony's interests, he may after giving due notice to the manager, declare such school 
an unlawful one."22 In order to remove all political content at Chinese schools, this 
ordinance not only declared the British colonial government's right to perform 
periodic school inspections, but also required all existing and new schools to be 
registered with the Director of Education. Schools that failed to register were forced to 
shut down. Moreover, all staff members of these schools, including teachers and 
managers, were required to register, too.
The Straits Chinese objected to this policy because, unlike English and Malay 
vernacular schools, Chinese schools were established without government assistance 
and were financed with private funds from wealthy Chinese.23 The ordinance ignited 
panic among the Chinese in the British colonies. Mass demonstrations among local 
Chinese erupted, propelling the Straits Chinese to petition the Chinese government. 
The protestors requested that Chinese authorities act on their behalf to ask the British 
government to nullify the regulation. The Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce, for 
instance, held an urgent committee meeting.24 V. K. Wellington Koo, a diplomat who 
participated in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, acted on the Straits Chinese request 
and asked the British government to lift its colonial policy. He explained that Chinese 
residents in the British colony, who constituted more than 50 percent of the colonial 
population, were filled with fear.25 26
The Straits Chinese attempted to lift the restrictions in two ways. First, they 
requested that Chinese officials speak with British authorities on a diplomatic level, 
and, second, at the same time, they sent two representatives of the Straits Chinese 
community to London to discuss this issue directly with British imperial government 
leaders.25 The Straits Chinese were concerned that the Education Bill would cause a 
serious setback for Chinese education, because the functioning of Chinese schools 
relied on the supply of teachers recruited from China (many of whom were steeped in 
GMD doctrine and political thought).27 A few months later, in August 1921, British 
authorities stated that the colonial government would not interfere with Chinese 
schools, with Chinese-language instruction, or with the use of Chinese textbooks if 
those teaching facilities and materials did not contain teachings that would harm the 
welfare of the British empire.28
British authorities attempted to eliminate ideological indoctrination that was 
hostile to British authority in Malaya by exerting strict control on the circulation of pro- 
Chinese and anti-British teachings. However, after the British launched the Education 
Bill of 1920, GMD became more aggressive in advocating anticolonialism. Not being
22 CO 273/510/49105, Registration of Schools Ordinance 21 of 1920, clause 19 (1).
23 CO 273/510/49105 (June 7,1921).
24 CO 273/510/52960 (September 1921).
25 CO 273/510/49105 (May 2,1921).
26 CO/ 273/510/44887; CO 273/511 / 3578.
27 CO 273/510/49105 (May 2,1921).
28 CO 273/511 / 3578, December 26,1921, "Reply to the Hon'ble Mr. P. T. Allen to a question by the Hon'ble 
Mr. Song Ong Siang on the working of the Registration of Schools Ordinance."
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able to spread its political message in the British colonies, GMD used schools in China 
as the center for ideological indoctrination for overseas Chinese students. Particularly, 
Jinan College, the school that the Qing empire especially opened and designed for 
overseas Chinese and operated under the guidance of GMD in the post-Qing era, 
became increasingly vocal against the British empire.29 By the mid-1920s, China's war 
against British imperialism climaxed when British colonial authorities, fearing that an 
imperium in imperio might be organized on British territory, repeatedly launched 
policies to eradicate GMD branches and Sun Yat-sen's influence in Malaya.30 Great 
Britain's aggressive strategy against the GMD in British Malaya and Hong Kong 
escalated China's hostility towards the British empire.
It was in the years leading up to the height of Sino-British tension that Jinan 
became a training center where students were expected to become agents of spreading 
pro-Chinese and anticolonial sentiments in the European possessions. In 1922, decades 
before British Malaya and Singapore won independence from Britain, a Jinan lecturer 
expressed his opinion that a new independent country encompassing the Malay 
Peninsula and the Straits Settlements would be born. He stated:
... the masters of this new political division will certainly be Chinese ... I do not 
advise you to revolt against the British authority at once, because first you must 
be prepared yourself to organize a government and conduct affairs, otherwise 
even if the British authority should be overthrown, you will be helpless. Now is 
the time for you to build up your political ability, because the future masters of 
the Malay Peninsula are you students of this College.31
Due to Jinan's mission of nurturing its students to take over political rule of the 
European possessions in Southeast Asia, British colonial authorities described Jinan as 
the main fortress of Chinese imperialism in the modern era, and one that should not be 
welcomed or supported by colonial powers in Asia.32 But Jinan did not target the 
British as its main enemy when it reopened, after being shut down, in 1917. British 
intelligence analysts revealed it was not until 1920, when the British government 
launched its Education Bill, that the British empire became Jinan's key target in its fight 
against Western imperialism. Jinan's anti-British attitude was stimulated by overseas 
Chinese complaints. According to colonial reports, the Chinese residing in the Straits 
Settlements and Sumatra requested admission to Jinan only after they complained to 
the Chinese government that British authorities had passed laws that restricted 
Chinese education in the Malay Peninsula.33
British intelligence officers were convinced that Jinan at the time of its founding in 
1906 and at its reopening in 1917 (or 1918), was not guided by anti-British motives.34 It 
reported that, compared to Jinan, "Chin Bee" College, in Xiamen, demonstrated more
29 Jinan, established in Nanjing in 1906, was also referred to as "the Java school" in its early years. It closed 
after the fall of the Qing Dynasty (1912) and reopened in Shanghai in 1917.
30 Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 213-18.
31CO 273/ 520/23272; MBPI, no. 8 (October 1,1922), section 41.
DNA 2.05.90-528, Afschrift Kantoor voor Chineesche Zaken No. 514/23, Zeer Geheim (Weltevreden, 
September 13,1923).
33 MBPI no. 8 (October 1,1922), p. 42.
34 Classes started in 1918, but preparations to reopen the school started in 1917.
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anti-British tendencies and an overall political agenda that was more hostile to British 
authority than was Jinan's. The school's president, Lim Boon Keng, a Chinese from the 
Straits Settlements, was a fervent supporter of the British empire, but became 
increasingly oriented towards China after British authorities decreed that Straits 
Chinese of non-European descent would be ineligible to receive Queen scholarships 
and take on high positions in civil administration. After the fall of the Qing Empire and 
the founding of the Republic of China, Lim became increasingly supportive of China. 
He served as Chinese consul to Surabaya in 1913 and 1914, and became president of 
Xiamen University, which was mostly funded by Tan Kah Kee, a Chinese who was 
born in Xiamen, but who built a business empire in Singapore. Yet, despite China's 
stated ambition to expand to Southeast Asia, British leaders did not seem to be as 
worried about China's threat as were Dutch authorities, for, according to British 
authorities, the Chinese realized they lacked the political ability to do so.35 Therefore, 
British authorities did not mitigate their anti-Chinese policies. In fact, the colonial 
government further intensified its efforts to eliminate political influences that came 
from China. In 1927, a few years after the British colonial government launched the 
Education Bill with the purpose of eradicating GMD's ideological indoctrination, it 
declared all GMD branches as illegal associations. The British concentrated their war 
on Chinese expansionism in the British possessions. Despite Jinan's anti-British 
standpoint, the British did not directly confront Jinan. Instead, they focused on 
eliminating GMD's political ideas and influence.
The Dutch East Indies
British enactment of the 1920 Education Bill motivated Dutch authorities to 
reinforce their border policy and restrictions on Chinese education in the Indies. 
Already starting from at least 1907, as noted above, Dutch colonial authorities sought 
ways of preventing Chinese officials, educational examiners, and teachers from 
entering the Indies, but found that immigration rules were insufficient to cut off all 
influences and the interference from China that seemed to be flowing into the colony. 
In January 1920, the Secretary of the Government suggested enforcing strict border 
controls and restricting people from entering the colony altogether.36 37However, it was 
not until 1922, after the British had launched the 1920 Education Bill, that the Dutch 
government launched a more aggressive policy to control the spread of what was 
called "Chinese imperialism." According to Dutch officials, Chinese expansionism was 
primarily based on educational networks linking China and Southeast Asia. Therefore, 
Dutch colonizers naively assumed that tightening anti-Chinese policies that were 
fashioned after the British empire's strict educational policies would dispel the 
impression that the Dutch were the greatest oppressor of Chinese people.3'
Yet in Chinese and overseas Chinese writing the Chinese under Dutch rule were 
often depicted as a group that received even harsher treatment than did their fellows
35 MBPI no. 8, p. 42.
36 DNA 2.05.90-528, Bijdrage voor het Pekingrapport van 1922 no. 53 (Weltevreden, August 19,1922): 
"Overheidscontrole op particulier Chineesch Onderwijs" (Governmental Control of Chinese Private 
Schools).
37 Ibid.
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residing in the British colonies. Due to close relationships between Straits Chinese and 
the Chinese in Java, Indies Chinese often compared their position and life situations 
with those of the Chinese under British rule.38 Although the British colonial 
government also enforced a racial stratification system, the Chinese in the Straits 
Settlements enjoyed more rights and freedoms than did those under Dutch control. 
Unlike the Dutch, who did not formally assign a legal status to Indies Chinese, the 
British regarded those born in the Straits Settlements as British subjects regardless of 
race. The British also did not impose residence and travel restrictions within the British 
colony, and did not discourage commingling of races.39 Therefore, the Dutch 
government used the British Education Bill of 1920 as a sign that British anti-Chinese 
policies were growing more aggressive than Dutch policies.
Although Dutch authorities did not radically sharpen their own border and 
educational policies until the British had enforced their education bill, the Dutch 
colonial government initiated its efforts to block the proliferation of Chinese schools 
and their ideological influences more than a decade before British authorities actively 
sought to eradicate the influences of Chinese education on the colonial population. 
Already, since the earliest stages of China's expansion into Southeast Asia, by way of 
migration at the beginning of the twentieth century, Dutch metropolitan and colonial 
governments sought ways to curb China's influence on the Indies Chinese. They 
countered China's interference on Indies Chinese affairs on Dutch territory by 
repeatedly using the so-called afweer-politiek (politics of defense), particularly in the 
fields of politics, education, and commerce. Yet after maintaining this campaign 
against Chinese imperialism for more than a decade and a half, Dutch authorities 
realized it had not succeeded. From the Dutch state's perspective, although the Dutch 
campaign was relatively successful in promoting naturalization and advancing 
political issues that helped attract support from the Indies Chinese, it failed to make 
satisfactory progress in limiting China's educational influences.40
Evaluating China's expansionist strategies in 1922, Dutch officials concluded that 
education was China's most effective means for expanding its sphere of influence
38 There was a close relationship between Indies Chinese and Straits Chinese. The Chinese from Singapore 
played an important role in re-sinicizing the Indies Chinese. The Confucian revival movement in 
Singapore that argued for adopting a modern interpretation of Confucianism revived interest in Chinese 
language and culture, promoted social reforms such as education, strengthened women's positions, and 
eliminated outdated Chinese traditions, and that movement soon spread to the Indies. Lim Boon Keng, a 
leader of the Confucian revival movement in Singapore, played an important role in spreading the 
movement to the Indies. He gave lectures in Java, requested two Chinese from Java, Tan Ging Tiong and 
Yoe Tjai Siang, to translate the Confucian classics into Malay, and played an advising role in appointing 
educators and designing curricula for the first Chinese schools in Java. See Tan Ging Tiong and Yoe Tjai 
Siang, Kitab Tai Hak—Tiong long (Soekaboemi: Soekaboemische Snelpersdrukkerij, 1900); "Chinese Schools 
in Java," The Straits Chinese Magazine 10,2 (June 1906), p. 100; Yen Ching-Hwang, "The Confucian Revival 
Movement in Singapore and Malaya, 1899-1911," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 7,1 (March 1976): 33- 
57; Ming Govaars-Tjia, Dutch Colonial Education: The Chinese Experience in Indonesia, 1900 1942 (Singapore: 
Chinese Heritage Centre, 2005), pp. 54-55, 62-63; Song Ong Siang, One Hundred Years' History o f the 
Chinese in Singapore (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967), pp. 235-36; and "Tiong Hoa Hwe 
Koan," The Straits Chinese Magazine 4,16 (December 1900), p. 183.
39 Skinner, "Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia," pp. 70-71.
40 DNA 2.05.90-528, Bijdrage voor het Pekingrapport van 1924 no. 24: "Betieffende de al -o f  niet 
wenschelijkheid van een bezoek door onzen Consul Generaal te Shanghai and de Chinan-school te 
Nanking." Dutch Consul General in Shanghai visited Jinan in Nanjing on December 21,1923.
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beyond its borders. Dutch authorities regarded Chinese education as a vehicle of 
"Chinese imperialism," and realized that it was a powerful tool for feeding a sense of 
Chinese nationhood. According to the Dutch government, out of several methods that 
China had used for building a "Young China," education had been the most effective. 
Education was most threatening for Dutch rule because, according a Dutch official, 
"this type of nationalism was anti-Western and contained imperialistic tendencies."41 
Private Chinese education, which was unsupervised by Dutch officials, was especially 
dangerous because, according to the Dutch government, education about the history of 
Chinese governance incited people of Chinese descent to work to establish a "Young 
China," a collective entity guided by nationalist, anti-Western, and imperialist 
characteristics.42 For this reason, Dutch authorities continuously tried to eliminate the 
influence of Chinese private schools.
The first Chinese private school, known as "Sekolah Tjina THHK" (Tiong Hoa Hwe 
Koan school, #  hereafter THHK), was established in 1901 in Patekwan, 
Batavia.43 Motives for establishing THHK were diverse. Some historical documents and 
scholarship stated that THHK's primary goal was to modernize and correct 
misinterpreted Chinese traditions, while other sources pointed out that THHK 
provided a practical curriculum that would help increase Indies Chinese 
competitiveness in commerce and other professions. Indies Chinese who desired 
treatment that was equal to what Europeans and Japanese received saw education for 
Chinese children as a way to improve the deteriorating position of Indies Chinese 
relative to others in the colony.44 Regardless of THHK's initial motives, the 
establishment of the institution did not benefit Dutch rule, for THHK reinforced its 
students' cultural and national ties with China. According to Henri Borel, THHK's 
significance resided in "the spirit that emanated from the school movement ... [it is 
important] not so much for the present, but for the future. That spirit sought in the first 
place enlightenment and advancement for the Chinese, and was in the second place 
strongly Chinese-nationalistic."45
Although the Dutch government was wary about the establishment and popularity 
of THHK-type schools, it was not until 1906, when authorities saw the increased 
aggressive intervention of the Chinese state, that the Dutch government made a major 
shift in its educational policies. Two developments ignited Dutch anxiety. The first was
41 DNA 2.05.90-528, "Overheidscontrole op particulier Chineesch Onderwijs"; Mona Lohanda, The Chinese 
and the Dutch in Colonial Java, 1890-1942 (Jakarta: Yayasan Cipta Loka Caraka, 2002), pp. 50-62.
42 BB 2194/32.
43 "Chinese Association" is a loose translation of "Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan." THHK schools were opened by 
the THHK association. The first THHK association was established in Batavia in 1900. Considered to be 
the first pan-Chinese association in the Dutch East Indies, THHK bridged the barriers between peranakan 
Chinese and singkeh Chinese and included members from various Chinese dialect groups. A great number 
of THHK branches and THHK schools were opened throughout the Dutch East Indies after the Indies 
Chinese opened the first branch in Batavia. See Lea E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis o f 
the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1916 (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
44 Kwee Tek Hoay, The Origins o f the Modern Chinese Movement in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast 
Asia Program, 1969), pp. 8-21; Charles Coppel, "The Origins of Confucianism as an Organized Religion in 
Java, 1900-1923," Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies 12,1 (March 1981): 179-96; P. H. Fromberg, Verspreide 
Geschriften (Leiden: Leidsche Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1926), p. 450; Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism; 
and Ming Govaars-Tjia, Dutch Colonial Education, p. 61.
45 Borel's quote was taken from Ming Govaars-Tjia, Dutch Colonial Education, p. 62.
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that Japan was growing in power and might one day collaborate and become partners 
with China in opposing Western colonialism.46 As the quotation at the beginning of 
this essay revealed, Japan's victory in the Japan-Russo War in 1905 sparked hope 
among Asians who were victims of Western imperialism. Japan became a model for 
China and Chinese people. A student from THHK in Batavia, for example, wrote in an 
essay: "China is so much bigger than Japan! How magnificent could we become if the 
great China reorganizes! We could become the most powerful nation in the world, but 
first we need education to reach that goal."47
The second development was the intensifying relationship between Indies Chinese 
and the Chinese state through educational organizations such as THHK, but especially 
via the reopened Jinan. Since its establishment in Nanjing in 1906, Jinan aimed at 
training Indies Chinese children to become leaders of the anticolonial movement. 
According to Dutch officials, they were given the task of stirring the larger Indies 
Chinese community to sever political allegiance (staatsverband) with the Dutch empire. 
Jinan, operating under the Viceroy of Nanjing (who called himself the Grand Official of 
the South Seas [1^9#^ E ]) , was established initially as a school to nurture Dutch Indies 
Chinese to become more oriented towards the Qing government. According to a Dutch 
official, students were taught to learn the Chinese language, math, geography, history, 
music, and even arms trade. Most concerning was that Jinan's approximately one 
hundred students between twelve and eighteen years old looked more like Javanese 
than "their yellow brothers." Many students were Chinese descendants mixed with 
Malay blood, spoke Malay, had short hair, and wore Indo-European clothes instead of 
pigtails and Chinese dress. Dutch authorities were concerned that Jinan made Malay- 
looking Chinese become oriented towards the Chinese government. Moreover, they 
were worried that these young students would, upon their return to Java, spread 
Chinese nationalistic sentiments among the indigenous population.48 Chinese officials 
started to establish a system of political interference by stirring Jinan students to act 
against Dutch power. Dutch Consul-General Von Zeppelin confronted the Qing state 
in 1909 on this matter, but Dutch authorities found that Jinan's mission, goals, and 
attitude remained unchanged after it reopened.49
Jinan closed after the fall of the Qing empire (1912), but reopened around 1917, as 
noted above. Compared to British authorities, Dutch officials were more anxious about 
Jinan's reopening. Seeing it as part of China's resurrection of Sino-centrism, which held 
on to the notion that Chinese emperors were rulers, followed by vassals who 
controlled the power beyond the center,50 the Dutch empire was positioned as the bad 
ruler that was doomed to lose power.51 Therefore, Dutch authorities strongly resisted 
Jinan's growth, for in their minds, "Jinan was the principal stronghold of Chinese
46 DNA 2.05.03 -578.
47 L. H. W. van Sandick, Chineezen buiten China: Hunne Beteekenis voor de Ontzvikkeling van Zuid-Oost-Azie, 
speciaal van Nederlandsch-Indie ('s Gravenhage: M. van der Beek's Hofboekhandel, 1909), p. 255.
48 DNA 2.05.03-41, Afschrift No 1196/106 (Shanghai, 7 July 1908).
49 DNA 2.05.90-528, "Bijdrage voor het Pekingrapport van 1924 no. 24."
50 DNA 2.05.90-528, "Afschrift Kantoor voor Chineesche Zaken to Gouverneur-Generaal van 
Nederlandsch-Indie," pp. 7-8 (Weltevreden, September 13,1923).
51 Ibid.
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imperialism in the modern period that should not be welcomed by the colonial powers 
in Asia."52
Controlling the Flow of Students, Teachers, and Consuls
Students
Dutch authorities implemented and enforced strict border controls after Jinan 
resumed its anticolonial cause when it reopened in 1917. Many students at Jinan came 
from the Indies and reinforced Dutch fears that students were trained to become 
extremists advocating anti-Western rule.53 Therefore, viewing Jinan students as 
dangerous agents bent on spreading Chinese imperialism overseas, Dutch immigration 
officers prevented Indies Chinese students from returning to the Indies upon receiving 
their education at Jinan.54
Soon after Dutch authorities implemented new border restrictions, the Chinese 
government initiated improved diplomatic relations with Holland by inviting Dutch 
officials to visit the school. However, H. Mouw, an official holding the post of Adviseur 
at the Bureau of Chinese Affairs starting from 1919, mistrusted China's efforts to repair 
Sino-Dutch diplomatic relations.55 Since the school's establishment, Jinan had taken a 
hostile stand against Dutch rule, but Dutch officials were particularly suspicious about 
Jinan's strong relationship with the Colonists' League (Lianhehui, I? eMi')- The 
Colonists' League was intensely involved in overseas Chinese affairs and led the 
Chinese re-nationalization campaign at the time.56 57With branches extending over the 
port cities in Southeast Asia and coastal cities in China, the league worked closely with 
overseas Chinese communities, Chinese associations, and local and central 
governments in China. Strong connections between the league and Jinan were evident. 
For example, in 1923 the league's secretary took a Dutch official on a tour of Jinan. 
During this meeting, the secretary showed the Dutch official Jinan yearbooks from 
1922 and 1923. Most students in those books were not allowed to return to the Indies, 
due to the Dutch prohibition that forbade Jinan students from reentering the Indies."
Dutch concerns regarding a steady influx of radicalized students returning from 
China were exaggerated. In fact, according to a Dutch official based in Shanghai, many
52 DNA 2.05.90, Afschrift Kantoor voor Chineesche Zaken No. 514/23, Zeer Geheim, p. 4.
53 F81, "The Chinese Movement in Netherlands India," p. 3.
54 DNA 2.05.90-528, document no. 2754/134 (Shanghai, December 13,1923). Although Dutch officials 
found that not all students at Jinan upheld an "extremist" approach to the colonial government, Dutch 
officials rejected most graduates' requests to enter the country. Some students who were permitted entry 
to the Indies were later asked to leave the colony.
55 DNA 2.05.90-528, Bijdrage voor het Pekingrapport van 1924 No. 24 (March 19,1924).
56 The Colonist's League (Lianhehui) was established in 1911 by Bai Pingzhou, who was anti-Dutch. He 
was involved in the Chinese naturalization campaign of 1908-09. The League served as a middleman for 
the movement against Dutch naturalization and turned its building into the headquarters of the 
movement. The League also engaged in educational and economic affairs. In the early 1920s, it was 
involved in Jinan's affairs and, at the same time, intervened in the campaigns to revoke restrictive 
European laws in the South Seas, seeking to benefit China's industry. DNA 2.05.90-528: Kantoor voor 
Chineesche Zaken Document no. 68/ 34 (Weltevreden, January 25,1924).
57 DNA 2.05.90-528, document no. 2754/134, Dutch Consul General in Midden-China (Shanghai, 
December 13,1923).
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students at Jinan stayed in China after their graduation with the purpose of 
establishing branch offices of their family businesses that were headquartered in the 
Dutch colony. Their primary goal for attending Jinan had been merely to acquire 
business skills, general knowledge, and language proficiencies that were useful for 
commerce.58 59These students were not interested in fulfilling China's political 
expectations and were primarily interested in advancing and expanding their family 
businesses from the Indies to China.
Teachers
Students were not the only transnationals who were perceived as a threat by 
colonial authorities. Besides preventing Jinan's students from re-entering the Dutch 
colony, the Dutch government also enforced strict border controls limiting the entry of 
teachers. The network connecting the Chinese government and Chinese schools, 
particularly the THHK, was tight. Most Chinese teachers who relocated to Southeast 
Asia came from China's coastal areas. In January 1925, for example, three teachers 
originating from Jiangsu went to Java and Billiton. In addition, three educators went to 
Batavia to work at THHK. One educator from Zhejiang became head of the school 
while two educators, one from Jiangxi and one from Jiangsu, were hired as 
instructors.^
The institutionalization of Jinan's teacher-training program and the organization's 
decision to admit female students accelerated the enactment of stricter measures by the 
colonial power. After launching the training program, Jinan regularly sent teachers to 
work at Chinese schools in Southeast Asia. Dutch authorities regarded teachers who 
were sent by Jinan as products of anti-Western imperialism, and believed that each 
teacher was an extension of Jinan.60
The school had been increasingly sending male and female graduates overseas to 
work at Chinese schools. Fearing that anti-Dutch thoughts would infiltrate the Indies, a 
colonial advisor of Chinese affairs wrote:
The purpose is clear: Jinan continuously tries to make the mobile youth active 
and make them serve the interests of the fatherland and resist the colonial
58 DNA 2.05.90-528, "Onderwijzend personeel uit China voor Indie," from Neth. CG in Midden China 
(Groeneman) to Mr. WF Roell, Legation in Beijing (Shanghai, August 7,1925); DNA 2.05.90-528:
Bruineman (Adviseur/ Hoofd van den Dienst der Chineesche Zaken). Bijdrage voor het Pekingrapport 
van 1923 No. 73, "Toelnting van Chineesche onderwijzers in Nederlandsch-Indie, afkomstig van de school 
te Nanking [Chinan Institute]."
59 2.05.90-528, Consulaat-Generaal der Nederlanden voor Midden China, doc no. 1881 /113,
"Onderwijzend personeel uit China voor Indie" (Shanghai, August 7,1925). The additional information 
that follows gives an idea of the reach of Chinese teachers from coastal China who were sent to teach at 
THHK branches in the Indies. Jiangsu had a strong network linking it to Batavia and the Outer Islands, in 
particular. In February 1925, one teacher from Anhui went to Bangka, a teacher from Zhejiang went to Deli, 
and a teacher from Kiangsu went to Batavia. In March 1925, two teachers from Hunan went to Pekalongan; 
in July 1925, one teacher from Jiangsu went to Bangka; and in August 1925, three teachers from Kiangsu 
went to Pontianak.
60 In 1923, for example, two female teachers, Hsia Sung Wei and Chen Chao Yang, were refused the chance 
to teach i n the Indies because, according to the Department of Justice, they had studied at Jinan. See DNA 
2.05.90-528, Afschrift Departement van Justitie No. 2/3/16 (Weltevreden, September 21,1923).
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government that is represented in propaganda as a usurper and an oppressor. ... 
Interference can no longer be tolerated otherwise recently implemented 
inspections on teachers would be useless.61
Dutch government actions prompted a streamlining of the exchange of information 
between the Dutch consulates in Beijing, Shanghai, and the colonial government in the 
Indies. In order to remove enemies from their territory, the Dutch Immigration Office 
monitored teachers' behavior and updated their information regularly. Dutch 
authorities in Shanghai did not issue visas for instructors without consulting the Indies 
government. The consuls-general did not issue permits unless they had sufficient 
reassurances that proved that the teachers were not propagandists.62
Policy barriers that blocked Chinese teachers from entering the Dutch Indies 
reached their height in 1925. One authority wrote about the necessity to keep the 
colonial borders closed to extremist instructors.63 This expression emerged when 
GMD's anticolonial voice has risen to its highest pitch. Fearing that the GMD would 
"awaken the rebellious spirit" among the overseas Chinese resident in the colony, the 
Dutch government strictly prohibited access to education for GMD members and 
refused teachers from Jinan entry to the Dutch East Indies. The danger of "poisoning" 
children with Chinese education (vergiftiging van het Chineesche onderwijs) came 
particularly from GMD members who diligently followed their duty of propagating 
the party's principles through the curricula. These members, Dutch officials believed, 
encouraged students' involvement in political demonstrations.64
Consuls
Besides limiting the circulation and influence of teachers, students, and political 
thoughts, the Indies government struggled to block the intervention of Chinese 
officials in Chinese schools. One such case arose following the establishment of a 
Chinese Middle School in Surabaya in 1929. In this year, Mouw reported that the first 
signs of the Chinese government's interference in the education of the Indies Chinese 
had emerged. From these signs, Dutch authorities discovered that the Chinese were 
carrying out two contradictory policies simultaneously. Despite China's 1914 
agreement with Holland that it would follow a policy of non-interference, Dutch 
officials uncovered a document revealing that consular intervention in educational 
affairs was of utmost importance for China. This document, from China's Ministry of 
Education, stated that engaging with educational affairs was an integral task of 
Chinese consuls, including those who were stationed in the Dutch East Indies.65 On the 
one hand, it was obvious that, at the level of international politics, China adopted a 
conformist policy of non-interference in the affairs of overseas Chinese. On the other
61 DNA 2.05.90-528, Bruineman (Adviseur/ Hoofd van den Dienst der Chineesche Zaken). Bijdrage voor 
het Pekingrapport van 1923 No. 73, "Toelating van Chineesche onderwijzers in Nederlandsch-Indie."
62 DNA 2.05.90-528: "Onderwijzend personeel uit China voor Indie" (Shanghai, August 7, 1925); ibid.
63 DNA 2.05.90-528, C.S. Shanghai 1009/ 71 (Beijing, July 21, 1925).
64 DNA 2.05.90-528, Uitreksel Ag. 932x), 2613x)24, 2035x), 1. Algemeene onderwijsverbod voor leden der 
Kuo Min Tang; 2. Wering van Chinan-leerkrachten.
65 DNA 2.05.90-528, Peipingrapport no. 99/ 29, doc. no. 80/ 3 (Batavia, August 13, 1929); Afschrift no. 261, 
"Bemoeiing van den Chineeschen Consul met onderwijsaangelegenheden" (Buitenzorg, August 13, 1929).
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hand, at the national and domestic levels, China continued to strengthen its ties with 
overseas Chinese communities and coordinated its educational outreach initiatives by 
way of its consuls overseas.
GMD consuls-general were clearly involved in establishing middle schools in 
Batavia and Surabaya in this period.bb Based on police reports from Surabaya in 1929, 
Mouw concluded that the Chinese consul had been engaged in the establishment of the 
Chinese Middle School in Surabaya (Heshu Huaqiao Xuetang, jprJf jjf).6 7 A
report revealed that, on the advice of the consul, the school recruited two Chinese 
instructors who had received their education in the United States. Under the 
supervision of the consul, three elected committee members of the school board 
examined teachers' skills and credentials. A consul-in-training was appointed to 
manage daily affairs. In 1929, the school board was in the process of launching school 
propaganda, asking for donations, and preparing for students' entry exams, with the 
aim of opening its new school in September.68
In order to deny Chinese consuls the opportunity to interfere in local educational 
affairs in Surabaya, in 1929 Mouw referred to a written statement dated May 18, 1914, 
in which China's Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Sun Baoqi ( H l f J f ) ,  
guaranteed that Chinese consuls who were posted in the Dutch Indies would not 
intervene in educational matters.69 He also asked the Governor-General to use this 
statement to serve as a warning for the Chinese consul, demanding that he cease his 
involvement in local education since such actions were in conflict with the Sino-Dutch 
agreement.70
Although the Chinese consul in Surabaya played a leading role in the construction 
and organization of the school, the request to build a school had come from Li 
Shuanghui (Lie Siong Hwie, ^  I t  iff), a former president of the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce in Surabaya. In his letter to the Chinese consul in Surabaya, he stated: 
"When I arrived here, I saw that there was no continuing education for 30,000 children.
66 DNA 2.05.90-528, "Bemoeienis van den Chineeschen Consul te Soerabaja met onderwijs- 
aangelegenheden" (August 3,1929). In Pertiiagaan, July 22,1929, the Chinese consul-general in Batavia 
announced that he was trying to establish a middle school in Batavia. Li Shuanghui and the consul-general 
in Surabaya were in the process of building a similar school in Surabaya in this period.
67 DNA 2.05.90-528: 2.05.90-528, Algemeene Politie Soerabaya Afdeeling Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst - 
Chineesche Zaken no 220, "Bemoeienis van den Chineeschen Consul te Soerabaja met onderwijs- 
aangelegenheden" (August 3,1929).
68 DNA 2.05.90-528, Algemeene Politie Soerabaya Afdeeling Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst - Chineesche
Zaken no 220. Police report with regards to the school's committee meeting on July 19,1929, dated July 23, 
1929, by officer Friehs. These teachers were: Zheng Paoyuan (MPlShi), who received his doctoral and 
medical degrees in the United States. When his wife, Lin Yuying OfcfcEEJD, was twenty-eight years old, she 
obtained her doctoral degree and was sent to the United States by Chin Kua University at the 
government's expense. They were in Singapore and were going to Surabaya (also see news article, Kiauzv 
Sing Djit Po, Surabaya July 23,1929). Participants included Li Shuang Hui (L  I f ,  Lie Siong Hwe), Consul 
Guo Consul Kuo), Thio Tjee An ( 'jl iff $ ) ,  Oen Siauw Giok, Yap Djim Swi (111' T A), Poh Kho Eng
('ff- ; A), Ko Han Tjong (A A U ), Lee Kong Yauw, Lie Kong It, Lim Tjeng Hoen, Gouw Sie Soen, Tjioe 
Tjeng Yan, Yap Tan Boe, Kiauw Im Kong, Koh Siok Hoek, and Tjou Toen Bwe.
69 DNA 2.05.90-528: "Bemoeiing van den Chineeschen Consul met onderwijsaangelegenheden." From 
Algemeene Secretarie in Buitenzorg, August 13,1929, to GG in Eastern Java. Sun Baoqi, a Qing official and 
a supporter of Yuan Shikai, served as minister of foreign affairs in 1913 and 1914.
70 DNA 2.05.90-528: Kantoor voor Chineesche Zaken no. 568/ 29, "Bemoeienis Chineesche Consuls met 
onderwijsaangelegenheden" (Weltevreden, August 3,1929).
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Hence, I proposed to establish a middle school in Surabaya, with the purpose of 
maintaining the level of education and development for Chinese immigrants."1 Li's 
outreach to the Chinese consul prompted the colonial government to tackle the matter 
directly and forcefully with the Indies Chinese community. The provincial governor 
warned Li Shuanghui, who had been appointed president of the new middle school, 
that the Chinese consul was not allowed to intervene in educational affairs. If the 
school deviated from this rule, the colonial government would revoke its agreement to 
permit those instructors to teach in the Indies. The colonial government asserted its 
power to employ legal documents when matters threatened its authority, and it cited a 
governmental regulation (staatsblad 1923 no. 136) to declare that the relationship 
between Chinese residents and Chinese consuls endangered the interest of the colony 
and threatened its long-term goal of maintaining public peace and order.'2
Fragile Borders
As noted above, in 1914 the Dutch government signed an agreement of non­
interference with China's minister of foreign affairs (during Yuan Shikai's rule). In an 
attempt to prevent consuls from overstepping their authority, Dutch officials forced 
the Chinese to state in a consular agreement that consuls were allowed only to engage 
in commercial—not educational—activities. The 1914 agreement highlighted the fact 
that consuls' interference with local education was strictly forbidden. However, as the 
example in 1929 showed, the regulations and policies only had limited effect, as 
Chinese officials continued participating in educational matters.
Although preventing Chinese instructors and students from entering European 
colonies helped to reduce the spread of Chinese "imperialist" ideas, stringent border 
controls never succeeded in completely eliminating the circulation of political ideas 
and the intervention of the Chinese government in educational affairs. A report from 
1929 that notes thirty-three cases in which teachers were arrested and banned from 
instructing students, for example, showed that colonial authorities continued to face 
the threat that students were being politically indoctrinated at Chinese schools.71 23 
Politically active teachers listed in this report were concentrated in Java, but the 
document also mentioned some instructors teaching in Sumatra, Borneo, and Menado. 
They were charged with spreading political propaganda, such as teaching Sun Yatsen's 
doctrine of 'Three Principles of the People," and for using teaching materials that 
contained political messages. Many arrested instructors were expelled from the Indies; 
some teachers were held in prison, while others were forced to stop teaching for
71 DNA 2.05.90-528: Li Shuanghui's letter to Chinese Consul Guo in Surabaya; originally from Sin Po 25 
(April 1929).
72 DNA 2.05.90-528: Kantoor voor Chineesche Zaken No. 568/ 29, "Bemoeienis Chineesche Consuls met 
onderwijsaangelegenheden." (Weltevreden, August 3,1929.
73 This report also contained information about punishments meted out by the Siamese government. Dutch
and Siamese governments punished fifty-two Chinese instructors, out of whom nineteen instructors were 
penalized by the Siamese government. Generally speaking, Siamese punishments were more severe than 
Dutch punishments. See Qian He, "huaqiao xuexiao zhiyuan chujing ji beibubiao" ( T  fl) #  .i|[i| j|  tB
* 1 * ) ,  in Nanyang huaqiao xuexiao zhi diaocha yu tongji, ed. Qian He (Shanghai: Dahua, 1930).
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reasons that are unclear. Dutch officials also examined students. In one case, a teacher 
was forced to leave his post after his student wrote an essay about judicial equality.74
Dutch Affirmative Policies
One of Holland's relatively subtle methods for decreasing Indies Chinese political 
orientation towards China was to try and make Indies Chinese more Dutch-oriented. 
Paranoia about the flow of anti-Dutch ideas prompted Dutch authorities to open 
Hollandsche-Chinese schools (Dutch Chinese public school, hereafter HCS) in 1908. 
Witnessing the power of education for nourishing Chinese national consciousness, 
Dutch authorities, by following the example of the Chinese government, aimed at 
engendering allegiance and political loyalty through their own schools. HCS were 
aimed at the Chinese (especially peranakan Chinese) and monitored by the Dutch 
government. Overall, HCS were successful in attracting and educating Indies Chinese 
students. HCS were opened under the same conditions as schools for indigenous 
inhabitants. Instruction was completely in Dutch, and the curriculum was similar to 
curricula at European primary schools. Admission to HCS was conditioned upon 
sufficient proficiency in the Dutch language.75 Some Indies Chinese regarded these 
schools as a good start in progress toward an effective public educational program, but 
were not completely satisfied. Tan Siauw Lip, from Semarang, who held the rank of 
Kapitein, for instance, found that the Dutch attempt to meet the educational needs of 
Chinese children was all well and good, but he also expressed the wish that Chinese 
children be allowed to take exams under the same conditions as Dutch children. He 
also hoped that Chinese people would receive the same job opportunities as did the 
Dutch.76 Indies Chinese responses to HCSs' establishment revealed that their main goal 
was to obtain equal rights and status in the colony.
The first HCS opened in 1908, a little over a year after Jinan's founding. The HCS 
curriculum aimed at "Dutchifying" Indies Chinese, and so contrasted with the 
curricula of THHK, which aimed at "Sinification." Fearing that Indies Chinese students 
were becoming increasingly politically supportive of a Chinese empire, Dutch 
authorities wanted to reduce the wave of Chinese nationalism in the Indies and 
reinforce Dutch authority over its subjects by implementing affirmative policies.77 They 
were concerned by the activities of both THHK and Jinan. Like the Chinese, the Dutch 
sought to use education as a means to inculcate loyalty. They hoped to nourish the 
Chinese sense of inclusion within colonial society through the HCS.
74 This fascinating list released names of detainees and "colonial violators." It also revealed the names of 
schools where these instructors were employed, their punishments, and the reasons and dates for 
punishment. A number of instructors spread anti-foreignism, and taught the youth to "hate foreigners" 
and to organize boycott committees with the purpose of boycotting foreign goods. Teachers who arrived 
in the Dutch Indies often used textbooks that were based on Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles" (sanmin 
zhtiyi). Dutch officials prohibited instructors who taught anti-foreignism or used sanmin zhuyi to continue 
teaching. See Ibid.; and F81 #29, 34, and 36.
75 L. H. W. van Sandick, Chineezen buiten China: Hunne Beteekenis voor de Ontunkkeling van Zuid-Oost-Azie, 
special van Nederlandsch-Indie ('s Gravenhage: M. van der Beek's Hofboekhandel, 1909), pp. 204-5.
76 Ibid., p. 206.
77 Wen Guangyi | S)<k 4t |, Yindunixiya Huaqiao shi [ C  A -4 WSL (Beijing: Haiyang, 1985), p. 461.
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Two Competing Teacher's Programs: Jinan and HCS
In 1920, Jinan added the Teacher's Program to its curricula. This program trained 
Chinese students from overseas as teachers, so that they might take their knowledge to 
Southeast Asia upon graduation. Following Jinan, the Dutch, likewise, soon extended 
their educational program by establishing a Teachers' School in Meester Cornelis, in 
Eastern Batavia, where Indies Chinese students received training to become instructors 
at HCS. Previously, teachers at HCS were solely of Dutch descent, but with the HCS 
Training Program, the Dutch government aimed at training Indies Chinese to become 
teachers in their own communities. They believed that this system would be more 
effective for nourishing loyalty to the Dutch state. This belief was further strengthened 
after the Dutch witnessed how the British Education Bill of 1920 aggravated Sino- 
British relations and escalated Chinese discontent in British Malaya.
Dutch authorities established the general training school in 1917. By 1920, this 
school underwent a complete reorganization, after which its goal was to train 
exclusively teachers of Chinese descent who would teach at HCS after graduation. 
During their five years of instruction at this boarding school, teachers-in-training 
would learn skills for teaching classes with a maximum of twenty-five students under 
the supervision of the local committee of European schools (Europeesche 
Schoolcommissie) and Inspecteur of Lager Onderwijs. The coursework was 
determined by the Director of Education and Religion (Onderwijs en Eeredienst). 
Students learned the Dutch language and writing, math, biology, musicology, drawing, 
pedagogy, gymnastics, arts, and violin, as well as the history and geography of the 
Netherlands and the Dutch Indies. Like Jinan, Dutch authorities also included courses 
that would meet the demands of the Indies Chinese community. The curricula 
concentrated on practical learning and offered instruction in the Chinese language, but 
did not offer Chinese history or geography classes. It also accommodated Chinese 
celebrations in addition to Christian and Dutch national holidays. Thus, the content of 
HCS coursework was, in many aspects, similar to the curricula that Jinan and THHK 
offered; both Dutch-oriented and China-oriented education also took into account the 
demands of Indies Chinese who desired to receive education in practical learning for 
professions such as commerce.78 Dutch training schools also resembled Jinan's training 
schools in terms of their underlying purpose: both aimed at training Chinese teachers 
to be loyal to the state. These teachers, who served as intermediaries between the state 
and the masses, would then, ideally, further disseminate loyalty toward the state to the 
rest of the Chinese community.
Strict admission requirements and the lack of statistical data make it difficult to 
evaluate the results of the Dutch teacher-training program. Selection criteria for 
attending the school were extremely restrictive. Only students who graduated from 
seven years of HCS schooling or a European school (Europeesche school) were eligible to 
apply for admission. The head of the education department then determined who 
would be accepted or rejected. Students who failed to work hard, whose proficiency in 
the Dutch language was insufficient, who exhibited improper behavior, or who 
suffered from contagious diseases risked being suspended from school.
78 DNA 2.05.90-528: "Ontwerp leidraad voor de Kweekschool tot Opleiding van Chineesche onderwijzers 
en onderwij/.eressen bij het Hollandsch Chineesch onderwijs" (Batavia, April 10,1920).
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Education and Naturalization
HCS admission requirements for the teacher-training programs included Dutch 
naturalization (onderdaanschap).79 The introduction of this new educational program in 
the Dutch colony was closely interwoven with the Chinese naturalization movement 
that took place in this period simultaneously. Between 1917 and 1921, in an attempt to 
escape from Dutch colonial treatment, Dutch Indies Chinese, in collaboration with the 
aforementioned Colonists' League, aimed at invalidating their status as Dutch subjects 
by sending petitions to the Chinese government with the request that they be 
naturalized by China. Propagators of this movement had strong connections with 
Chinese educational institutions and associations. They were involved in expanding 
and stimulating Chinese education among the Indies Chinese.80
Dutch authorities hoped to end the growing Chinese naturalization movement 
among the Indies Chinese and win the political allegiance and loyalty from Indies 
Chinese by implementing educational policies that would benefit the Indies Chinese. 
Therefore, educational policies and opportunities for the Indies Chinese were 
intrinsically intertwined with Dutch policies regarding nationality issues. School 
attendance was limited to boys and girls who were naturalized as Dutch subjects. The 
Dutch government was mostly concerned with subjects of Chinese descent, more than 
other minorities, for this group "dealt with the onderdaanschaps issue most 
unpleasantly."81
Two reasons motivated Dutch authorities to include nationality requirements in its 
educational policy. First, limiting HCS admission to Dutch subjects exclusively would 
attract, secure, and further cement Indies Chinese loyalty to the Dutch state. Second, by 
making the school available only to Dutch subjects, Dutch authorities expected that it 
would encourage members of the Indies Chinese population to become naturalized 
Dutch subjects. Being conscious that Chinese education contributed to Indies Chinese 
desires of becoming Chinese nationals, the Dutch were convinced that problems with 
regards to education and nationality were closely connected. In his report to Beijing, 
Bruineman, chief of the Chinese affairs office, stated that an advantage of becoming a 
teacher at HCS training schools was that it required Dutch naturalization, which was 
attractive to the Chinese.8^ The Dutch office for Chinese affairs expressed the opinion 
that, when the Dutch metropolitan and colonial governments imposed the Law of 
Dutch subjectness or Naturalization Law (Onderdaanschap) on the Indies Chinese by 
force in 1910, with the purpose of officially claiming Indies Chinese as Dutch subjects, 
Dutch authorities paid insufficient attention to the educational issue. According to 
Dutch officials, failing to take educational benefits into account had caused the 
movement against Dutch naturalization to rise and spread extensively.83 Therefore, by 
including naturalization conditions in its educational policies, Dutch authorities
79 Ibid., Article 12.
80 AS 03-23-023-02-011; AS 03-23-024-01-007; AS 03-23-023-03-011; AS 03-23-025-03-013.
81 DNA 2.05.90-528: Afschrift no. 365/20 (dated Weltevreden, June 19,1920).
82 DNA 2.05.90-528: Afschrift no. 333/IIa (dated Batavia, August 3,1920).
83 DNA 2.05.90-528: Afschrift no. 365/20 (dated Weltevreden, June 19,1920).
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attempted to resolve two problems (namely, Indies Chinese need for Chinese 
education and their desire for obtaining Chinese nationality) that otherwise would 
benefit China's expansionist ambitions but were potentially disastrous for Dutch 
authority.
While these innovations were intended to attract support and allegiance from the 
Indies Chinese, the educational initiative also intentionally sharpened a division, 
separating the existing Indies Chinese population from new immigrants (also called 
totoks or singkehs). By allowing only Chinese students with Dutch naturalization to 
attend HCS, the Dutch made an attempt to segregate peranakan from singkeh. 
Bruineman requested privileging peranakan Chinese above singkeh by amending 
staatsblad 1908, sub I, and by not allowing singkeh to attend HCS schools.84 Bruineman 
explained that the rules the Dutch government created for the Chinese had been 
applicable to both peranakan and singkeh—people that the Dutch government regarded 
as, respectively, subjects and non-subjects. Yet, disadvantageous regulations, such as 
the conscription law, only applied to Dutch subjects. The conscription law and 
problems with Chinese consular protection became recurring complaints after the 
Kudus incident took place and motivated Dutch subjects of Chinese descent to discard 
their Dutch status.85 The Dutch affirmative policy on education was therefore a way for 
the Dutch government to prevent its subjects from seeking favor with China versus 
being naturalized as Dutch. To safeguard emotional attachment, according to 
Bruineman, it was important that the Indies Chinese would feel privileged. The many 
requests for establishing and expanding schools, and parents' expressions of 
disappointment when their children were rejected for admission, revealed that the 
Indies Chinese were not entirely dissatisfied with Dutch educational policies; they 
aspired to enter their children in the HCS schools, but wanted, even expected, good 
public schooling to be made more widely available.86
Furthermore, solely admitting peranakan Chinese would help counter political 
influence from China that was often spread by singkeh. In the opinion of Dutch officials, 
singkeh imported direct influences from China and were largely nationalistic; they 
would hinder the Dutch goal of nourishing peranakan Chinese with "a sense of 
commonness" (gevoel van saamhorigheid) regarding the Dutch state. In particular, 
Bruineman strongly opposed ever allowing a singkeh Chinese to become head or an 
advisor at the training school for HCS,87 for, as this essay shows, Dutch authorities 
were particularly concerned with the imperialist, anticolonial thinking that recent 
migrants from China brought to the Indies.
Conclusion
"The Chinese threat" is not a new topic in the study of Dutch colonial rule. Feeling 
threatened by the increasing and widespread economic power of the Indies Chinese, 
the Dutch colonial government, as the scholarship on Indonesian Chinese has shown,
84 DNA 2.05.90-528: Afschrift no. 333/Ha (dated Batavia, August 3,1920).
85 DNA 2.05.90-528: Afschrfit no. 365/ 20/ zeer geheim, p. 2X.
86 DNA 2.05.90-528: Afschrfit no. 365/ 20/ zeer geheim, p. 2.
87 Ibid.
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drew geographic and racial boundaries to control the power of the Chinese throughout 
the nineteenth century. As explained above, in order to safeguard Dutch interests, 
Dutch officials monitored the Chinese by confining their mobility with the quarter 
system and pass system. Many studies of this topic have made reference to the impact 
of China's interest in Indies Chinese affairs on the political orientation of the Indies 
Chinese. What is lacking, however, is a study of how China's increasing interference 
changed Dutch perceptions of threat. In this essay, I argue that, although the Dutch 
evidenced Sinophobia in the first decade of the twentieth century, the 1920s was a 
crucial period, for during that decade Dutch perceptions shifted, and the authorities 
began to perceive China, rather than resident Indies Chinese, as the true threat. This 
shift resulted in a change of Dutch border policies, as drawing geographic and racial 
boundaries within the colony was no longer of primary importance. Instead, to protect 
Dutch possessions, it was necessary to enforce border policies to thwart external 
influences.
Launching border protections against China's influences was not limited to the 
Dutch East Indies. British authorities, too, were concerned about China's expansionism 
as it related to Southeast Asia. Europe's escalating fear of what it perceived as 
"Chinese imperialism" in the 1920s was coupled with the multiplication of border 
controls and educational policies that helped limit transnational interactions between 
China and the Chinese communities in both Dutch and British dominions. The 
proliferation of GMD-guided schools, GMD's war against Western imperialism, and 
the reopening of Jinan College in 1917 sparked widespread colonial anxiety in British 
and Dutch Asia. Jinan was the school that Dutch authorities described as "the fortress 
of Chinese imperialism," an enterprise that used education for overseas Chinese as a 
means of "peaceful penetration" to extend its sphere of influence to colonial Southeast 
Asia. Colonial authorities were anxious because the school not only nourished 
anticolonial sentiments, but it also promulgated the idea that Southeast Asia should be 
ruled by Chinese people. Because of prevailing Sinophobia in the region, both British 
and Dutch colonial authorities launched educational policies that obstructed the 
spread of Chinese expansionism.
Whereas British authorities attempted to eradicate political ideological influences 
on Straits Chinese by launching its Education Bill in 1920, the Dutch government 
adopted both discriminative and affirmative policies. Discriminative actions included 
barring certain students, teachers, and Chinese officials from entering the Dutch colony. 
Meanwhile, Dutch authorities, for the first time in 1908, opened public schools 
exclusively for the Chinese, though, as noted above, these schools were effectively 
reserved for the peranakan Chinese, not totok or singkeh Chinese. In doing so, Dutch 
authorities attempted to compete with local Chinese schools, especially THHK, that 
were connected with the Chinese government and Jinan. HCS curricula were in many 
aspects comparable with THHK's coursework. From its observations of Chinese 
schools, the Dutch government noticed that education was a powerful weapon for 
evoking a sense of Chineseness. Schools were a powerful medium for narrowing the 
ties between Chinese authorities and the overseas Chinese. Therefore, when Jinan 
opened its teacher's program with the purpose of training students to become 
educators at overseas Chinese schools, Dutch authorities, using a similar rationale, 
opened a teacher's program to train Dutch subjects of Chinese descent to become HCS 
teachers. From the Dutch viewpoint, having Indies Chinese students receive
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instruction from Indies Chinese teachers would be an effective way to decrease the 
popularity of Chinese schools and attract Indies Chinese support and loyalty to the 
Dutch state.
This essay has approached the proliferation of border control and both 
discriminative and affirmative educational policies from the perspective of Europe's 
paranoia regarding the Chinese threat. It has also showed that Dutch fixation on 
protecting its colonial borders and the efforts of eradicating Chinese imperialist ideas 
flowing into the colonies caused Dutch authorities (perhaps unwillingly and 
unintentionally) to create new educational and naturalization opportunities for the 
Indies Chinese.
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